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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1995 Supp.). Following transfer from the Utah Supreme Court, the
Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(k) (1995 Supp.).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
A.

ISSUES FOR REVIEW.

1.

Did the District Court err in finding that Defendant and Appellant Roger T.

Russell ("Russell") was not a "successor to the judgment debtor" within the meaning of
Rule 690) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore lacked the capacity to redeem
two parcels of real property (the "Subject Property") which Plaintiff and Appellee Mark L.
Rindlesbach ("Rindlesbach") had purchased at a sheriffs sale? Russell raised this issue in
the District Court in his memorandum in opposition to Rindlesbach's Motion for Summary
Judgment ("Opposition Memorandum"). (Rec. pp. 517-521.)
2.

Did Evan W. Hansen ("Evan") have apparent authority to act on behalf of

Drew William Hansen ("Drew") and Diana M. Hansen ("Diana") when he entered into an
oral agreement with Russell for the purchase of the Subject Property? Russell raised this
issue in the District Court in his Opposition Memorandum. (Rec. pp. 521-523.)
3.

Did Drew and Diana ratify Evan's act of selling the Subject Property? Russell

raised this issue in the District Court in his Opposition Memorandum. (Rec. pp. 523-526.)
4.

Is the oral agreement between Russell and Evan for the purchase of the

Subject Property specifically enforceable? Russell raised this issue in the District Court in
his Opposition Memorandum. (Rec. pp. 526-528.)

5.

Did the District Court err in finding that Russell's acts performed in reliance

on the oral purchase agreement failed to meet the test of exclusive reference, i.e., that they
would not have been performed had the contract not existed? Russell raised this issue in
the District Court in his Opposition Memorandum. (Rec. pp. 528-529.)
6.

Did the District Court err in finding that Russell had no legitimate right or

interest in the subject property? Russell raised this issue in the District Court in his
Opposition Memorandum. (Rec. pp. 517-529).
B.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.

This matter is on appeal from the District Court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of Mark L. Rindlesbach ("Rindlesbach") and against Russell. The issues for review
set forth above involve whether a material fact exists with respect to Russell's ownership
of, and interest in, the Subject Property and, therefore, whether the District Court properly
entered summary judgment in favor of Rindlesbach. In reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, the appellate court views the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party.
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184, 192 (Utah
1991). In deciding whether a district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law
to the prevailing party, the appellate court reviews the judgment for correctness. Winegar
v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104,107 (Utah 1991). This standard is particularly appropriate
to this action, in which the District Court ruled solely on the basis of affidavits filed in
support of and in opposition to Rindlesbach's Motion for Summary Judgment and did not
observe the demeanor, credibility or competency of witnesses. See Matter of Adoption of
Infant Anonymous. 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 25, CHAPTER 5, STATUTE OF FRAUDS
25-5-1.

Estate or interest in real property.

No estate or interest in real property other than leases
for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over
or concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto,
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared
otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by
his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
25-5-8.

Right to specific performance not affected.

Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to
abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific
performance of agreements in case of part performance thereof.
TITLE 78, CHAPTER 37, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
78-37-6.

Right of redemption — Sales by parcels — Of land and water stock.

Sales of real estate under judgments of foreclosure of
mortgages and liens are subject to redemption as in case of
sales under executions generally. In all cases where the
judgment directs the sale of land, together with shares of
corporate stock evidencing title to a water right used or
intended to be used, or suitable for use, on the land, the court
shall equitably apportion such water stock to the land, or some
part thereof, in one or more parcels, as it may deem suitable
for the sale thereof, and the land and water stock in each
parcel shall be sold together, and for the purpose of such sale
shall be regarded as real estate and subject to redemption as
above specified. In all sales of real estate under foreclosure the
court may determine the parcels and the order in which such
parcels of property shall be sold.
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 56(c). Summary Judgment.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall
be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
RULE 69Q) (1)- Redemption of real property from sale.
(1) Who may redeem. Real property sold subject to
redemption, or any part sold separately, may be redeemed by
the following persons or their successors in interest: (A) the
judgment debtor; (B) a creditor having a lien by judgment,
mortgage, or other lien on the property sold, or on some share
or part thereof, subsequent to that on which the property was
sold.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves Russell's asserted right to redeem the Subject Property in his
capacity as the successor in interest to Drew and Diana, who were the judgment debtors
in this case and the former owners of the Subject Property. On November 18, 1993,
Rindlesbach, who had acquired the beneficiary's interest in a trust deed encumbering the
Subject Property and other property, filed a Complaint seeking judicial foreclosure of the
trust deed. On January 6, 1994, Russell filed an Answer to Rindlesbach's Complaint, as
well as a Counterclaim, Crossclaim and Third-Party Complaint, in an attempt to protect his
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asserted interest in the Subject Property. On February 17, 1994, Rindlesbach filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment seeking the relief sought in his complaint and dismissal of
Russell's Counterclaim. On June 23, 1994, the District Court entered its Order Granting
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of Rindlesbach and also entered a Decree
of Foreclosure on all of the property subject to Rindlesbach's foreclosure action, including
the Subject Property.
Following entry of the Decree of Foreclosure and an Order of Sale, Rindlesbach
purchased the Subject Property at a sheriffs sale conducted on August 2, 1994, paying
$88,000.00 for the parcels comprising the Subject Property.
Six months later, on February 2, 1995, Russell filed his Petition for Determination
of Entitlement to Redeem the Subject Property and, pursuant to a Stipulation and Joint
Motion Respecting Redemption, Russell paid to the Court the redemption price for the
Subject Property, $93,280.00. Twenty days later, on February 22, 1995, Rindlesbach
commenced a new action, this time seeking to quiet title to the foreclosed property. On
March 21, 1995, the foreclosure action and the quiet title action were consolidated under
the consolidated civil number 930906701. On May 9, 1995, Rindlesbach filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment and Default Judgment against defendants other than Russell. On
December 22,1995, the District Court entered its Order on PlaintifPs Motion for Judgment
Against Various Defendants, by which it granted Rindlesbach's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Default Judgment. On August 11, 1995, Rindlesbach filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment against Russell. On December 22, 1995, the District Court granted
PlaintifPs Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Russell. Also on December
-5-

22, 1995, the District Court entered its Jud .?,ent and Decree Quieting Title in the Subject
Property. On January 18, 1996, Russell filed his Notice of Appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Before December 1987, Evan and his spouse, Geneva, held fee title to certain

real property located at approximately 1815 East Creek Road, Salt Lake City, Utah,
consisting of approximately 3.53 acres designated in six separate parcels, which included
the Subject Property. (Rec. pp. 414, 415, 487, 488.)
2.

On November 30, 1987 and December 7, 1987, Evan and Geneva conveyed

their Creek Road property to Drew and Diana by Quit Claim Deed. (Rec. pp. 415, 487,
488.)
3.

Drew and Diana acquired their interest in the Creek Road property in order

to enable Drew to collateralize a loan (the "Loan") from Capital City Bank (the "Bank") for
a business venture which later failed. The loan was evidenced by a Trust Deed Note (the
"Note") secured by Trust Deed (the "Trust Deed") which, at commencement of this action,
encumbered property which included the Subject Property. (Rec. pp. 418, 512, 533, 546,
547, 553.)
4.

When Drew became unable to repay the Loan, Dale Hansen ("Dale") (Drew's

brother), David Hansen (another brother), and Brook Hansen ("Brook") (Dale's son) all
made payments in Drew's behalf in an effort to save the property which their parents had
conveyed to Drew and Diana. (Rec. pp. 512, 547, 553.)
5.

Russell, who for many years had been a friend of Evan, also made several

payments on the Loan to assist Evan. (Rec. pp. 512, 534.)
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6.

In the spring of 1991, Evan, who had negotiated with at least two other

potential buyers, asked Russell to buy the Subject Property. While Russell was not initially
interested because he was experiencing financial difficulties following his wife's liver
transplant, he finally reached an agreement with Evan in 1991 to purchase the Subject
Property. The total purchase price was to be $115,000.00 and consisted of the following
components: $10,000.00 down; $15,000.00 to be paid by January 1, 1992; delinquent
property taxes of approximately $6,000.00 to be paid by Russell; and the Loan balance of
approximately $84,000.00 to be paid in monthly installments by Russell. In addition,
Russell agreed to grant Evan and Geneva a life estate in a portion of the Subject Property
which included their home. (Rec. pp. 513, 534.)
7.

Evan had his nephew, defendant Merrill G. Hansen ("Merrill"), prepare a

written contract to memorialize their agreement. The contract generally reflected the
parties' oral agreement. Russell did not sign it because he was experiencing creditor
difficulties at the time and did not want to jeopardize the Subject Property. (Rec. pp. 513,
534, 535.)
8.

Evan told both Brook and Dale that he had sold the Subject Property to

Russell. During the year or so beginning in August 1992, talk of the Subject Property and
of Russell's purchase dominated virtually every one of the many conversations among
Brook, Drew, Evan and Merrill. (Rec. pp. 513, 547, 553.)
9.

After Russell and Evan reached their agreement, Russell paid every monthly

installment of the Loan from April 1991 through June 1993, generally making the
payments to Evan. The total Russell paid to the Bank (or to Evan for payment of the
-7-

Loan) was approximately $26,000.00. Russell also paid $8,000.00 as a part of the down
payment and brought property taxes current by paying $7,688.92. Russell did not pay the
full cash payments within the time required by the oral agreement, but Evan allowed
Russell to make those payments late in light of Russell's financial circumstances. (Rec. pp.
513, 514, 535.)
10.

Russell took possession of the Subject Property in May 1991, and immediately

moved his own horses on to the Subject Property and exercised total control of the barn
and pastures. He paid water fees on the Subject Property, stored vehicles on it, mended
fences, cleaned up and maintained the Subject Property, hired help to clean the stalls, and
rented the Subject Property to others for horse pasturage. He would not have rented the
Subject Property from Evan to pasture his horses, since he had other property for that
purpose. Consistent with the life estate which Russell had granted to Evan and Geneva,
they continued to live in their home on a portion of the Subject Property, and Evan
volunteered to care for the horses. Except for storing an old car on a portion of the
Subject Property which Evan occupied, Drew and his family have not occupied the Subject
Property since Russell took possession. (Rec. pp. 514, 536.)
11.

On numerous occasions, Drew acknowledged his understanding and

acceptance of Russell's oral purchase agreement. For example: (a) Drew often became
visibly upset about Russell's delinquencies in payment of Loan payments and property
taxes; (b) on several occasions, he said that he could sell the Subject Property to
Rindlesbach, his boss, since Russell had no written contract; (c) when confronted by Dale
in July 1992, Drew stated in essence: "When Roger gets delinquent and Capital City is
-8-

ready to foreclose, Rindlesbach can come in"; (d) he made no effort to deter Russell from
making Loan payments in Drew's behalf; (e) on one occasion when Russell made a
delinquent payment, Drew informed him that he would continue to honor Russell's
purchase agreement; (f) on another occasion, Drew threatened Russell that if Russell did
not bring the delinquent taxes current, Drew would sell the Subject Property to
Rindlesbach (Russell brought the taxes current); and (g) in the late spring or early summer
of 1993, Evan told Brook that Merrill and Drew had come up with an idea to categorize
Russell's payments as "rent" and to disavow Russell's entitlement to the Subject Property.
Evan said that he would not stand for what they were doing because it would be ridiculous
to pay rent of $1,000.00 per month for the Subject Property as horse pasture; however,
he later acknowledged that the plan to squeeze Russell out was a "done deal," but that out
of the proceeds from Rindlesbach, Evan would pay Russell back for what Russell had paid
under the purchase agreement. (Rec. pp. 514, 515, 536, 537, 547, 548, 554.)
12.

But for the existence of the purchase agreement, Russell would not have

made any of the payments, nor would he have conducted any maintenance of the Subject
Property.

He never intended that any payment be construed as a loan, as a rental

payment, or as anything other than partial performance of his purchase obligation. He has
been ready, willing and able to fulfill all of his obligations under the purchase agreement.
(Rec. pp. 515, 537.)
13.

On or about August 10, 1993, Rindlesbach, as buyer, and Drew, Diana and

Evan, collectively as sellers, entered into an earnest money sales agreement by which Drew,
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Diana and Evan agreed to sell to Rindlesbach five parcels, including the Subject Properly.
(Rec. pp. 415, 417.)
14.

Closing of the sale under the earnest money agreement was conditioned upon

Rindlesbach's clearance of title to the property, including the Subject Property. (Rec. pp.
418.)
15.

On August 16, 1993, Russell recorded his Notice of Interest in the Subject

Property in the official records of Salt Lake County, Utah, as Entry No. 5579822, in Book
6731, at Page 2762. He supplemented the notice with a Correction Notice of Interest
recorded on August 17, 1993, as Entry No. 5581629, in Book 6733, at Page 1352. (Rec.
pp. 420.)
16.

On or about October 26, 1993, Rindlesbach purchased the Note and the

beneficiary's interest in the Trust Deed from the Bank. (Rec. pp. 418.)
17.

On November 18,1993, Rindlesbach initiated a judicial foreclosure action on

the Trust Deed Property by filing a Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court, styled
Mark L. Rindlesbach v. Drew William Hansen, et al.. Civil No. 930906701 (the "Foreclosure
Action"). (Rec. pp. 418, 419.)
18.

On June 23,1994, the District Court entered an order granting Rindlesbach's

Motion for Summary Judgment and entered a Decree of Foreclosure in the Foreclosure
Action. (Rec. pp. 419.)
19.

On August 2,1994, pursuant to an Order of Sale, Rindlesbach purchased the

property encumbered by the Trust Deed at a sheriffs sale for $98,036.11, of which
$88,000.00 was allocated to the Subject Property. (Rec. pp. 419.)
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20.

On or about November 17,1994, Drew and Diana executed Quit Claim Deeds

by which they quit claimed the Subject Property and other property to Rindlesbach. (Rec.
pp. 419, 496.)
21.

On or about December 2, 1994, Drew and Diana executed an Assignment of

Redemption Rights, assigning to Rindlesbach all of their rights to redeem the Subject
Property and other property from the August 2, 1994 sheriffs sale. (Rec. pp. 419.)
22.

On February 2, 1995, Russell filed his Petition for Determination of

Entitlement to Redeem the Subject Property. (Rec. pp. 319-327, 421.)
23.

Within the redemption period, Russell paid into the Third Judicial District

Court the full amount of the $93,280.00 redemption price for the Subject Property (subject
to stipulated augmentation for 1994 property taxes if Rindlesbach provided evidence of
payment). (Rec. pp. 516.)
24.

Rindlesbach's claims against each of the defendants in this case other than

Russell have been resolved. (Rec. pp. 421.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As a successor in interest to Drew and Diana, the judgment debtors in this case,
Russell has the right to redeem the Subject Property under Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-6
(1992) and Rule 69(j)(l), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Russell succeeded to the interest
of Drew and Diana in the Subject Property when he purchased the Subject Property from
Evan. Russell became the owner of the Subject Property under the doctrine of equitable
conversion because as the purchaser of the Subject Property, Russell acquired the equitable
interest in the Subject Property at the moment his purchase agreement with Evan became
-11-

fully enforceable. The doctrine of equitable conversion applies to Russell's purchase of the
Subject Property even though Russell dealt with Evan and not Drew and Diana, and even
though Russell and Evan did not reduce the agreement to writing, because (1) Evan
consummated the agreement with Russell as the agent for Drew and Diana, (2) Russell
could bring an action for specific performance, and (3) Russell satisfied the statute of
frauds by partly performing under the oral agreement.
Evan had apparent authority to act for Drew and Diana when he entered into the
agreement with Russell because Drew and Diana knowingly permitted Evan to act for them
and manifested their consent to his exercise of that authority. Acting in good faith, Russell
reasonably believed that Evan possessed such authority, and Russell changed his portion
in detrimental reliance upon Evan's apparent authority. Further, even if Evan did not have
apparent authority to act for Drew and Diana, Drew and Diana ratified Evan's act of selling
the Subject Property to Russell by accepting the benefits of Russell's act and failing to
disaffirm the agreement between Evan and Russell.
The agreement between Evan and Russell is specifically enforceable because its
terms were both sufficiently certain that Evan and Russell knew what was required of them
and definite enough that the courts could delineate their intent. Further, Russell has
tendered the purchase price for the Subject Property to Rindlesbach and has averred his
ability, readiness and willingness to fulfill all of his agreed obligations pursuant to the
purchase agreement.
Russell partly performed the purchase agreement to satisfy the statute of frauds by
making payments under the purchase agreement, possessing the Subject Property,
-12-

maintaining and improving the Subject Property, and even renting pasturage to others, all
in accordance with the clear and definite terms of the purchase agreement. Russell also
acted in reliance on the agreement and would not have performed as he did had the
agreement not existed. The failure of Evan, Drew and Diana to perform under the
agreement would have resulted in fraud on Russell because Russell relied to his detriment
on Evan's promise to sell the Subject Property, and damages would not compensate Russell
for loss of the Subject Property.
Each of the legal arguments stated above finds ample factual support in the
affidavits which Russell filed in opposition to Rindlesbach's summary judgment motion.
The trial court committed reversible error by failing to find that those affidavits created
material issues of fact which precluded summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
RUSSELL, THE SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO THE JUDGMENT DEBTORS,
MAY REDEEM THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS ITS OWNER UNDER THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION
Utah's right of redemption statute provides that "[s]ales of real estate under
judgments of foreclosure of mortgages and liens are subject to redemption as in case of
sales under executions generally." Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-6 (1993 Supp.). Those who
may redeem property sold subject to redemption, or any part sold separately, include "the
following persons or their successors in interest: (1) the judgment debtor; (2) a creditor
having a lien by judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or on some share or part
thereof, subsequent to that on which the property was sold." Utah R. Civ. P. 69(j)(l)
(emphasis added). Russell redeemed the Subject Property as a successor in interest to
-13-

Drew and Diana, the judgment debtors. A successor in intere,. to a judgment debtor is
defined as "the one who has acquired or succeeded to the interest of the judgment debtor
in the property... ." Forty-Four Hundred East Broadway Co. v. 4400 East Broadway, 135
Ariz. 265, 660 P.2d 866, 868 (Ct. App. 1982). Russell succeeded to the interest of Drew
and Diana in the Subject Property when he purchased the Subject Property on contract in
April 1991 and became its owner pursuant to the doctrine of equitable conversion.
"The doctrine of equitable conversion provides that 'an enforceable executory
contract of sale [upon which an action for specific performance could be brought] has the
effect of converting the interest of the vendor of real property to personalty.'" Lach v.
Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Willson v. State Tax
Comm'n, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1972)). The purchaser of real property
under the doctrine of equitable conversion "acquires the equitable interest in the property
at the moment the contract is created and is therefore treated as the owner of the land."
Lach, 746 P.2d at 805. In short, the purchaser of real property "has an equitable interest
in the property while the seller's interest is 'converted to the right to receive the proceeds
under the contract of sale.'" Lach, 746 P.2d at 805 (quoting Allred v. Allred, 15 Utah 2d
396, 393 P.2d 791, 792 (1964)) (emphasis in original).
An Arizona case with facts strikingly similar to those of this case shows that Russell,
as the successor in interest to Drew and Diana, was entitled to redeem the Subject Property
under the doctrine of equitable conversion. See Forty-Four Hundred East Broadway Co.
v. 4400 East Broadway. 135 Ariz. App. 265, 666 P.2d 866 (1982). In Forty-Four Hundred,
the trial court had held that a contract buyer of real estate was the successor in interest
-14-

to the judgment debtor/mortgagor in a foreclosure action brought by the holder of the
underlying mortgage. The court had ruled that the buyer's assignee was entitled to redeem
at any time within six months of the date of the foreclosure sale. IcL at 868. The appellate
court affirmed, explaining that "the vendee under a binding contract for sale of realty is the
owner and the vendor merely holds the legal title as personalty in trust for the vendee until
the latter completes his performance." IcL Significantly, the court then explained that the
"purpose of the statutory right of redemption for a successor in interest is to protect his
interest as owner of the property in question." IcL The court confirmed this right even
though the contract buyer was in default at the time of foreclosure.
Likewise in this case, Russell was entitled to redeem the Subject Property under the
doctrine of equitable conversion as successor in interest to Drew and Diana, even if Russell
was in default under his purchase agreement at the time of foreclosure (which he denies).
Russell became the owner of the Subject Property at the moment the agreement became
fully enforceable. The doctrine of equitable conversion applies to Russell's purchase of the
Subject Property even though Russell dealt with Evan and not Drew and Diana when he
entered into the agreement, and even though Russell and Evan did not reduce the
agreement to writing, because (1) Evan consummated the agreement as the agent for Drew
and Diana, (2) Russell could bring an action for specific performance, and (3) Russell
satisfied the statute of frauds by partly performing under the agreement.
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A.

Evan Acted As The Agent For Drew And Diana When He Entered Into The
Agreement With Russell.
1.

Evan had apparent authority to act for Drew and Diana.

Implicit in the District Court's ruling that Russell was not the successor to Drew and
Diana is the District Court5s reliance on Drew's affidavit, which flatly stated that he never
authorized Evan to act as his agent to sell the Subject Property. Standing alone, that
affidavit would undoubtedly have sustained a finding that Evan lacked actual authority.
But Russell's summary judgment defense did not rely on actual authority. Instead, the
affidavits of Russell, Brook and Dale which Russell filed with the District Court showed
that regardless of the extent of his actual authority, Evan had apparent authority to sell to
Russell. At the least, those affidavits created an issue of fact which precluded summary
judgment, because "even though an agent is not actually authorized by the principal, the
principal may nevertheless be liable to a third party based on the doctrine of apparent
authority." Luddington v. Bodenvest Ltd., 855 P.2d 204, 208-09 (Utah 1993). Apparent
authority has been defined as "conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted,
causes the third person to believe that the principal consents to have the act done on his
behalf by the person purporting to act for him." Luddington, 855 P.2d at 209. See also
Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73, 75 (Utah 1983) ("Apparent authority
exists . . . where a person has created such an appearance of things that it causes a third
party reasonably and prudently to believe that a second party has the power to act on
behalf of the first person . . . ."). The following elements must be established to show
apparent authority:
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(1) that the principal has manifested his [or her] consent to
the exercise of such authority or has knowingly permitted the
agent to assume the exercise of such authority; (2) that the
third person knew of the facts and, acting in good faith, had
reason to believe, and did actually believe, that the agent
possessed such authority; and (3) that the third person, relying
on such appearance of authority, has changed his [or her]
position and will be injured or suffer loss if the act done or
transaction executed by the agent does not bind the principal.
Luddington. 855 P.2d at 209.
The Russell, Dale and Brook affidavits abundantly established each of these
elements. The facts drawn from those affidavits are that during the time that Drew and
Diana were absolutely unable to make payments on the Loan, and thus would have faced
foreclosure without assistance, (1) Evan continued to live on the Subject Property, (2)
Evan and other family members made payments on the Loan, (3) Evan negotiated with at
least two potential buyers other than Russell, (4) Evan negotiated with Russell to sell the
Subject Property, and (5) Evan had Merrill prepare a written contract with Russell which
named Evan and Geneva as sellers. There is no evidence that Drew and Diana objected to
any of Evan's activities and transactions. It is reasonable to infer that Drew and Diana
consented to the exercise of Evan's authority in selling the Subject Property and knowingly
permitted Evan to assume the exercise of that authority.
Moreover, there is no evidence to contradict the proposition that Russell acted in
good faith and had reason to believe, and did actually believe, that Evan had the authority
to sell the Subject Property. Russell accepted this appearance of authority and changed his
position in reliance on it by actually possessing the Subject Property, making payments on
the Loan as required under the agreement, making improvements to the Subject Property,
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and even paying taxes on the Subject Property. See, e.g., McFadden v. Wilder, 6 Ariz. App.
60, 429 P.2d 694, 698 (1967) ("Equitable conversion could be found to have taken place
when the parties made their agreement. Plaintiff, who had been tenant on the property
to that point, made improvements, paid taxes, and no longer paid rent.,!). Indeed, Russell
stands to lose roughly $40,000.00 in out-of-pocket expenditures alone — every penny of
which benefitted Drew and Diana and no one else — if Evan's sale of the Subject Property
does not bind Drew and Diana. The District Court's failure to recognize Evan's apparent
authority was reversible error.
2.

Drew and Diana ratified Evan's act of selling the Subject Property.

"A principal may impliedly or expressly ratify an agreement made by an
unauthorized agent.

Ratification of an agent's acts relates back to the time the

unauthorized act occurred and is sufficient to create the relationship of principal and
agent." Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982). Ratification requires that the
principal "have knowledge of all material facts and an intent to ratify." IcL However, "a
purported principal may not be wilfully ignorant, nor may he purposely shut his eyes to
means of information within his possession and control and thereby escape ratification 'if
the circumstances are such that he could reasonably have been expected to dissent unless
he were willing to be a party to the transaction.'" IcL (quoting Moses v. Archie McFarland
&Son. 119 Utah 602, 230 P.2d 571, 573-74 [1951]).
Ratification is particularly evident when a principal accepts the benefits of a
previously unauthorized act. See, e.g.. Corral v. Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co., 129 Ariz.
333, 630 P.2d 1055, 1058 (1981) ("Acceptance of the benefit of an unauthorized act of
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one purporting to act as an agent amounts to ratification."); First Nat*1 Bank in Miles City
v. Nunn. 628 P.2d 1110, 1116 (Mont. 1981) ("It is well-settled that a principal who
accepts the benefits of an agency transaction cannot later deny there was an agency.
[Citation omitted.] Even if the agent's actions were unauthorized, the principal ratifies
them by receiving the benefits and is estopped to deny the agency."); C.H. Stuart, Inc. v.
Bennett. 617 P.2d 879, 885 (Okla. 1980) ("One who accepts the benefits of the
unauthorized acts of his agent ratifies the acts and accepts all the burdens and benefits of
the acts. It is not essential to ratification that the principal have knowledge of the acts of
the agent if the benefits from the acts are retained after the happening of such events as
would place a reasonably prudent person on inquiry.").
Even if Evan acted without the authorization of Drew and Diana under a theory of
apparent agency, Drew and Diana1 ratified the agreement between Evan and Russell. As
reflected by the affidavits of Russell, Dale and Brook, Drew and Diana knew that Evan had
sold the Subject Property to Russell. As the owners of the Subject Property, Drew and
Diana benefitted from Evan's sale of the Subject Property to Russell because Russell's
payments reduced the Loan balance and brought taxes current. Not surprisingly, Drew and
Diana expressed their willingness to be part of the transaction by failing to disaffirm the
agreement. See Bradshaw. 649 P.2d at 78. See also Ulibarri Landscaping Materials. Inc.
v. Colony Materials. Inc.. 97 N.M. 266, 639 P.2d 75, 79 (Ct. App. 1981) ("One may infer
affirmance by a principal of an unauthorized transaction of its agent from the principal's
The parties' affidavits were silent about Diana's role, but since the benefits of Russell's agreement with
Evan flowed to her just as they did to Drew, it is reasonable to infer that Drew's acts of ratification were
intended to bind both marriage partners and had her consent or acquiescence.
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failure to repudiate it."); Paragano v. Gray, 126 Or. App. 670, 870 P.2d 837, 842 (1994)
("Intent to ratify may be implied from the principal's neglecting promptly to disavow the
agent's act.").

Finally, and perhaps most important, Drew spoke often of Russell's

agreement and sought ways to get out of it, not to repudiate it. The compelling conclusion
from the affidavits is that Drew and Diana intended to ratify Evan's acts and are estopped,
under all of the circumstances, from denying their agency relationship with Evan after
benefitting from Evan's acts and failing to repudiate the agreement.
Because Evan acted as the agent of Drew and Diana, Drew and Diana were bound
by Evan's sale of the Subject Property to Russell. "It is well established in the law that a
principal is liable for the acts of his agent within the scope of the agent's authority,
irrespective of whether the principal is disclosed or undisclosed." Garland v. Fleischmann,
831 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added). The fact that Evan acted in his own
name without disclosing the identities of Drew and Diana "does not preclude liability on
the part of the principal when he is discovered to be such by a third party who has dealt
with the agent." Id. Significantly, "[t]his is true even though the third person dealing with
the agent did not learn of the existence of the principal until after the bargain was
completed." Id.
B.

The Oral Agreement Between Russell And Evan Is Specifically Enforceable.

Russell contends that the parties entered into an oral contract to convey an interest
in the Property. It is well settled that "[w]here the existence of an oral contract and the
terms thereof are contested and the evidence is conflicting, it is for the trier of fact to
determine whether the contract did in fact exist and, if so, the terms of such contract."
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Curran v. Hastreiter. 579 P.2d 524, 526 (Alaska 1978). Because Russell intends to
introduce evidence at trial showing that the agreement is specifically enforceable and
satisfies the statute of frauds, the District Courf s order and judgment should be reversed
and the case remanded to allow the trier of fact to determine whether the parties did in
fact enter into the agreement and, if so, the terms of that agreement.
"Before specific performance will be employed by the courts to enforce a contract
the terms of the agreement must be reasonably certain so the parties know what is
required of them, and definite enough that the courts can delineate the intent of the
contracting parties." Reed v. Alvev. 610 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Utah 1980). See also Eliason
v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427, 429 (Ut. 1980) ("Specific performance of contract depends on
whether the obligations of the parties are set forth with sufficient clarity and definiteness
that the contract can be performed according to its terms."). Further, "in a suit for specific
performance of a contract for the sale of realty, the purchaser must show that he paid the
purchase price, or tendered it, to the defendant prior to commencement of the suit.
However, an action for specific performance may also be maintained if the plaintiff presents
an excuse for his failure to make such payment or tender and avers his ability, readiness
and willingness to pay the contract amount." Reed. 610 P.2d at 1379.
The terms of the agreement between Russell and Evan were definite and certain, and
the proposed written document between the parties, although never signed, clearly
evidenced the intent of the parties to consummate the transaction. Russell and Evan
specifically described the realty which Russell agreed to purchase. Evan agreed to sell the
Subject Property to Russell for $115,000.00, and their agreement required Russell to make
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monthly payments of $1,000.00 for application to the Loan. Russell did in fact make over
two years' worth of monthly payments under the agreement and also paid $8,500.00 in
cash and $7,688.92 to bring property taxes current as required by the agreement.
Although Russell has not paid the entire purchase price, Russell has paid the full
redemption amount into court and has averred his ability, readiness and willingness to
fulfill all of his agreed obligations. These facts alone show that the agreement is certain
and definite enough to be specifically enforceable.
The Supreme Court of Utah has made clear that "the proper application of [the rule
that the essential terms of the contract must be definite] is as a shield to protect from
injustice, and not as a weapon with which to work an injustice." Tanner v. Baadsgaard,
612 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah 1980). Even though the parties' agreement was never reduced
to a signed document, its essential terms have never been disputed. To avoid injustice to
Russell, the agreement should be upheld.
C.

Russell's Part Performance Of The Oral Agreement Satisfies The Statute Of
Frauds.

Utah's statute of frauds provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
No estate or interest in real property . . . shall be created,
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by
act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1995). A statutory limitation on the harshness of this rule is
the doctrine of part performance:
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Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge
the powers of courts to compel the specific performance of
agreements in case of part performance thereof.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8 (1995).
The standards of sufficient performance are as follows:
First, the oral contract and its terms must be clear and definite;
second, the acts done in performance of the contract must be
equally clear and definite; and third, the acts must be in
reliance on the contract. Such acts in reliance must be such
that a) they would not have been performed had the contract
not existed, and b) the failure to perform on the part of the
promisor would result in fraud on the performer who relied,
since damages would be inadequate.
Martin v. ScholL 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983). Russell's performance, as presented to
the District Court in his affidavit, met each of these standards. First, as shown above, the
agreement between Russell and Evan and its terms were clear and definite enough to be
specifically enforceable. Second, Russell's acts — including payment of about $40,000.00,
possession of the Property, maintenance and improvement of it, and even his rental of
pasturage to others — were clear and definite. Third, Russell acted in reliance on the
agreement and absolutely would not have performed as he did had the agreement not
existed. Finally, Evan's failxire to perform under the agreement would have resulted in
fraud on Russell because (a) Russell relied to his detriment on Evan's promise to sell the
Property, and (b) damages would not compensate Russell for loss of the Subject Property
as a unique asset.
It is understood that ,f[r]eliance may be made in innumerable ways, all of which
could refer exclusively to the contract." Id. In this case, Russell had the option to keep his
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horses elsewhere, but chose to keep his horses on the Subject Property because he owned
it. Moreover, Russell had no reason to improve the Subject Property except that he owned
the Subject Property and wanted to improve its utility and appearance. Further, both
Russell and Evan acknowledged that payment of $1,000.00 per month for rent would be
absurd. Finally, Russell allowed Evan and his wife to stay on the Subject Property by
conveying a life estate interest to Evan, with Russell retaining the fee simple interest in the
Subject Property. All of these acts exclusively refer to the purchase agreement. Russell
was the owner of the Subject Property and not merely Evan's tenant.
In a remarkably similar case, the Utah Court of Appeals has recently held that a
party's part performance of an oral modification to a written escrow agreement saved the
oral modification from violating the statute of frauds. See George Fisher. Jr. Family Inter
Vivos Revocable Trust v. Fisher. 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). In Fisher.
the appellees purchased real property pursuant to a written escrow agreement. The parties
later orally modified the agreement's payment terms to allow the appellees to invest the
money in the property rather than make the required payments. During this time the
appellees had taken possession of the property and had improved it by installing sprinkling
systems, cleaning and grading the land, and installing ponds. When the oral modification
to the written escrow agreement was challenged in court as violating the statute of frauds,
the trial court found that the appellees' partial performance upheld the modification:
The contract was partially performed and [appellees] relied
upon the oral representations. The improvements were
substantial and valuable. The decision to invest in the
property rather than make payments was exclusively referable
to the oral modification. The Court believes that [appellees]
-24-

changed positions by performing on the oral modification so
that it would now be inequitable to permit [appellants] to
found their claim for breach on the original agreement as
unmodified.
Id. at 46. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, recognizing that "in reliance on
the oral modification, appellees changed their position and partially performed the
contract," and that "it would be inequitable to permit [appellants] to enforce the
unmodified agreement." Id.
Like the appellees in Fisher, Russell changed his position in reliance on his oral
agreement with Evan and partially performed the agreement by taking possession of the
Subject Property and making improvements to the Subject Property. Indeed, Russell's
actions in taking possession of the Subject Property and improving it, including mending
fences and cleaning up and maintaining the Subject Property, are essentially the same as
the appellees' actions in Fisher. Accordingly, Russell's substantial past performance of the
agreement satisfies the statute of frauds and compels enforcement of the agreement.
Russell's affidavit opposing summary judgment described his part performance in
detail. At the least, his affidavit created a material issue of fact which should have been
reserved for trial.
CONCLUSION
In granting Rindlesbach's motion for summary judgment, the District Court ruled
that Russell was not a "successor to the judgment debtor" and therefore lacked the
statutory capacity to redeem the Subject Property from the sheriffs sale. The District Court
also ruled that Russell's acts in reliance on the oral purchase contract failed to meet the
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test of exclusive reference. The District Court simply could not have made those legal
determinations without ignoring the opposing affidavits of Russell, Dale and Brook, since
those affidavits contained facts which, if true, would compel precisely the converse result.
The District Court's failure to consider the opposing affidavits in a light most favorable to
Russell constituted reversible error. Accordingly, Russell requests the following relief:
1.

That the District Court's Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment

Against Defendant Russell be reversed;
2.

That the District Court's Judgment and Decree Quieting Title in the Subject

Property in favor of Rindlesbach and against Russell be reversed; and
3.

That the action be remanded to the District Court, where Russell may be

accorded a trial on the merits.
DATED this / ? tf day of August, 1996.
JARDINE, UNEBAUGH & DUNN
A Professional Corporation

William G. Marsden
John N. Brems
Jeffery J. Devashrayee
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
Roger T. Russell
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vs.
ROGER T. RUSSELL, aka ROGER T.
RUSSELL. DDS; DREW WILLIAM
HANSEN, aka DREW W. HANSEN, and
DIANA M. HANSEN; GUARDIAN STATE
BANK; SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARK L. RINDLESBACH,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO. 930906701

Plaintiff,
vs.
DREW WILLIAM HANSEN and
DIANA M. HANSEN, et al.,
Defendants.
MARK L. RINDLESBACH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROGER T. RUSSELL, also known
as ROGER T. RUSSELL, DDS,
et al.,
Defendants.

The court previously granted in part plaintiff7s motion for
summary judgment. The court, however, reserved ruling as to parcel
No. 4.
judgment

The court now rules that plaintiff is entitled to summary
as

to

parcel

No.

4

for

the

reasons

set

plaintiff's memorandum and as expressed at the hearing.

forth

in

RINDLESBACH V. HANSEN
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MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiff's counsel is to submit a proposed judgment pursuant to
Rule 4-504, Code of Judicial Administration.
Dated this

/

day of October, 1995,

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

RINDLESBACH V. HANSEN

PAGE THREE

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this_
October, 1995:

T. Richard Davis
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84133
William G. Marsden
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Attorneys for Roger T. Russell
370 E. South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
David O. Black
Attorney for Defendants Hansen
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah
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T. RICHARD DAVIS (A0836)
900 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

MARK L. RINDLESBACH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DREW WILLIAM HANSEN and
DIANA M. HANSEN; EVAN W.
HANSEN, individually and as
Personal Representative for
the Estate of GENEVA B.
HANSEN; ROGER T. RUSSELL;
and BANK ONE, N.A., formerly
known as VALLEY BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, N.A.,
Defendants.
* * * * * * *

MARK L. RINDLESBACH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROGER T. RUSSELL, also known
as ROGER T. RUSSELL, DDS;
DREW WILLIAM HANSEN, also
known %s DREW W. HANSEN, and
DIANA M. HANSEN; GUARDIAN
STATE BANK; SMALL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST
DEFENDANT RUSSELL
Consolidated
Civil No. 930906701
Judge Michael Murphy

STATES OF AMERICA; UTAH
STATE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, as
Custodian of the Assets for
TRACY-COLLINS BANK & TRUST
COMPANY and TRACY MORTGAGE
COMPANY; MERRILL G. HANSEN,
also known as MERRILL
HANSEN; KATHLEEN HANSEN;
DARRELL DALTON; UTAH STATE
TAX COMMISSION; and EVAN W.
HANSEN, individually and as
Personal Representative for
the Estate of GENEVA B.
HANSEN,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.
* * * * * * *

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy on September 11, 1995
at the hour of 9:00 a.m.

Plaintiff being represented by his

attorney of record, T. Richard Davis of the firm Callister
Nebeker & McCullough; Defendant Roger T. Russell being
represented by his attorneys of record, William G. Marsden,
and John N. Brems of the firm Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown &
Dunn; and Defendants Drew W. Hansen, Diana M. Hansen,
Merrill G. Hansen, and Evan W. Hansen were represented by
their attorney of record, David O. Black of the firm Black,
Stith & Argyle; the Court having reviewed Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment, the Memoranda and Affidavits filed in
support and in opposition of said Motion, and having heard
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argument of counsel and being fully advised in the premises
and good cause appearing therefore,
THE COURT HEREBY finds.as follows:
1.

There are no bona fide issues of material fact

precluding the entry of Summary Judgment granting the relief
sought in Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment:

(1)

denying Russell's Petition for Determination of Entitlement
to Redeem; and (2) quieting title to all of the subject
property against defendant Roger T. Russell and in favor of
Plaintiff Mark L. Rindlesbach.
2.

Defendant Russell was not and is not either a

"judgment debtor" or a "successor to the judgment debtor"
and therefore lacked the statutory capacity required by Rule
69 in order to redeem the subject property from the
Sheriff's Sale.
3.

Defendant Russell was not a creditor holding any

valid lien on the subject property and therefore lacked the
statutory capacity required by Rule 69 in order to redeem
property from the Sheriff's Sale.
4. ' The acts allegedly performed by Defendant Russell
in reliance on his asserted oral contract of purchase of
subject property failed to meet the test of exclusive
reference, i.e., that they would not have been performed had
the asserted contract not existed.
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5.

Having acquired all of the subject property for

good and valuable consideration, Plaintiff Rindlesbach is
entitled to an Order Quieting Title to the property in his
name.
6.

Defendant Russell has no legitimate claim to any

right or interest in the property.
PURSUANT TO SAID FINDINGS, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

That Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be

and is hereby granted; and
2.

That Defendant Russell's Petition for

Determination of Entitlement to Redeem be and is hereby
denied; and
3.

That the Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to

deliver to Defendant Russell all sums paid into Court on or
about February 1, 1995, as a tender of Redemption Payment;
and
4.

That a JUDGMENT AND DECREE QUIETING TITLE

consistent with the Findings be entered.
DATED this 3 CL day of

VCC^

4

1995.

APPROVED as to form this
-^r- day of October, 19 9 5

David O. Black
Attorneys for Defendants Hansen
APPROVED a s t o form t h i s
J*4 day of Gefeotrer, 19J95:

William G. Marsde*
John N. Brems
Attorneys for Roger T. Russell
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST DEFENDANT RUSSELL was mailed, postage prepaid, on
this

day of October, 1995 to the following:
William G. Marsden
John N. Brems
Attorneys for Roger T. Russell
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
370 East South Temple, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David Black
Attorneys for Defendants Hansen
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE
1245 Brickyard Road, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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SALT L £ « 4 COUNTY
By

Dapuiy ClerK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

MARK L. RINDLESBACH,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT AND DECREE
QUIETING TITLE

vs.
DREW WILLIAM HANSEN and
DIANA M. HANSEN; EVAN W.
HANSEN, individually and as
Personal Representative for
the Estate of GENEVA B.
HANSEN; ROGER T. RUSSELL;
and BANK ONE, N.A., formerly
known as VALLEY BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, N.A.,

Consolidated
Civil No. 930906701
Judge Michael Murphy

Defendants.
* * * * * * *

MARK L. RINDLESBACH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROGER T. RUSSELL, also known
as ROGER T. RUSSELL, DDS;
DREW WILLIAM HANSEN, also
known as DREW W. HANSEN, and
DIANA M. HANSEN; GUARDIAN
STATE BANK; SMALL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA; UTAH
STATE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, as
Custodian of the Assets for
TRACY-COLLINS BANK & TRUST
COMPANY and TRACY MORTGAGE
COMPANY; MERRILL G. HANSEN,
also known as MERRILL
HANSEN; KATHLEEN HANSEN;
DARRELL DALTON; UTAH STATE
TAX COMMISSION; and EVAN W.
HANSEN, individually and as
Personal Representative for
the Estate of GENEVA B.
HANSEN,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.
* * * * * * *

Based on the Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment
Against Various Defendants and the Order on Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Russell, the
Court hereby enters Judgment in favor of Plaintiff, Mark L.
Rindlesbach, and against all Defendants set forth herein as
follows:
1.

Title to the real property located at

approximately 1815 East Creek Road South, Salt Lake City,
Utah particularly described as Exhibit "A" attached hereto,
is hereby- quieted in the name of Mark L. Rindlesbach.
2.

It is hereby declared that Plaintiff's

ownership and possession of said property is free and clear
of all claim of Defendants.

U7610-1

2

3.

That Defendants and ail persons claiming by,

through or under them or any of them are hereby and forever
barred and foreclosed of all right, title, claim, interest
in and to the property and each and every part thereof.
DATED this

day of October, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

%

Misters! K. I VHmgh^

District Court Judae
APPROVED as to form this
- ^ day of Qstober,—1995:

Dav4d^0. Black
Attorneys for Defendants Hansen
APPROVED as to form this
/W day of Q^^rertner, 1995

William G. Marsden
John N. Brems

A t t o r n e y s for Roger T.

Russell

^ 1 ^

EXHIBIT " A
That certain real property situated in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah more particularly described as
follows:
PARCEL 2:
Beginning South 1193.95 feet, more or less,
and West 1809.25 feet, more or less, and
South 75°48'20ff East 100 feet and North 9°16/
East 151.84 feet form the Northeast corner of
Section 33, Township 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North
0°16' East 50 feet; thence North 81°44' West
55.97 feet; thence South 8°16' West 50 feet;
thence South 81°44/ East 55.97 feet to the
point of beginning.
PARCEL 3:
Beginning 13 rods West and 61.12 feet North
and North 75°45' West 40 feet and North 8° 16'
East 100 feet from center of the Northeast
quarter of Section 33, Township 2 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
and running thence North 75°45' West 13 5
feet; thence North 8°16' East 101.84 feet;
thence North 81°44' East 41 feet; thence
South 8°16' West 72 feet; thence Easterly 69
feet, more or less, to the point of
BEGINNING.
PARCEL 4:
Beginning 214.5 feet West and 61.12 feet
North from the center of the Northeast
quarter of Section 33, Township 2 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
and running thence North 75°45' West 4 0.00
feet; thence North 8°16' East 100.00 feet;
thence North 51°23/35" West 110.03 feet;
thence North 8°16/ East 72.00 feet; thence
North 27°44'30" East 249.55 feet; thence
South 75°08,28" East 62.24 feet; thence South
7°30' West 272.00 feet; thence South 66°00'
147610-1
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West 2 6.4 feet; thence South 5°30/ West
174.01 feet to the point of beginning.
PARCEL 5:
BEGINNING at a point in the center of a
county road, said point being West 13 rods
and North 5°30' East 27.08 feet from the
center of the Northeast quarter of Section
33, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian; and running thence North
5°30/ East 207.44 feet;thence North 65° East
26.40 feet; thence North 7°30/ East 308.55
feet; thence West 295.18 feet to the West
line of the property described in that
certain Quit-Claim Deed dated February 24,
1956, and recorded as Entry No. 1472471 of
the records of Salt Lake County Recorder;
thence South 8°16' West 2 31.78 feet; thence
South 81°44' East 119.97 feet; thence South
8°16' West 201.84 feet to the center of a
county road; thence South 75°48'20fl East
169.12 feet to the point of BEGINNING.
LESS AND EXCEPTING therefrom the following:
BEGINNING at a point South 75°45'20" East 100
feet from the Southeast corner of the Salt
Lake County Water Conservancy District
property, which is South 1193.95 feet and
West 1809.25 feet from the Northeast corner
of Section 33, Township 2 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point
is also North 75°48'20" West 101.50 feet and
north 8°16' East 3 3.18 feet from a County
Street Monument at the intersection of Little
Cottonwood Creek Road and Telford way, said
street monument being 294.8 feet West and
51.64 feet North from the center of the
Northeast quarter of said Section 33, and
running thence North 8°16' East 100 feet;
thence South 75°45' east 13 5 feet; thence
South 8°16' West 100 feet; thence North
75°48/2 0lf West 13 5 feet to the point of
BEGINNING.
ALSO, LESS AND EXCEPTING therefrom Parcels 3
and 4 herein.
147610-1
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PARCEL 6:
BEGINNING at a point which is 253.80 feet
East of the Northeast corner of Lot 26,
CABALLERO RANCHES, a subdivision recorded in
the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder
and which is a part of Section 33, Township 2
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; and running thence South 08°16'
West 188.84 feet; thence West 253.80 feet to
the East line of Lot 26, CABALLERO RANCHES
SUBDIVISION; thence South 08°16' West 95
feet; thence East 303.80 feet; thence North
08°16' East 283.84 feet; thence West 50 feet
to the point of BEGINNING.
LESS AND EXCEPTING from all of the above any
portions lying within the bounds of Little
Cottoncreek Road.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing JUDGMENT AND DFC11EE' gUI ET:i NCi T J TIE war, mailed,
postage prepaid, on this ZC^day

of October, 1995 to the

following:
William G. Marsden
John N. Brems
Attorneys for Roger T. Russell
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
370 East South Temple, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David Black
Attorneys for Defendants Hansen
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE
1245 Brickyard Road, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Merrill G. Hansen
Pro Se
8160 South Highland Drive, Suite 109
Salt Lake City, Utah 84093
Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Joseph W. Anderson
Attorneys for U.S. Small Business Administration
U.S. Courthouse, Room 478
3 50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Stephen B. Mitchell
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Guardian State Bank
.139 East South Temple, Suite 2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jan Graham
Stephen W. Lewis
Attorneys for Utah State Tax Commission
50 South Main Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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Darrell Dalton
1160 North 4500 West
West Point, Utah 84404
Kathleen Hansen
2 69 East Edith Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

/jlti M^ftJJL^ir^

